Canada's foreign policy in the 1990s claimed to be centered on the importance of protecting an individual, over the state. The East Timor conflict explores the legitimacy of Canada's foreign policy and how it translates when it is forced into practice. This conflict exposes Canada's true agenda as it struggles to abide by its own self proclaimed foreign policy on human security, while maintaining national interest. Yet, before further analyzing Canada's role in East Timor, it is primarily essential to explore the history and events leading up to the conflict in 1999.
East Timor is the eastern part of the island of Timor, located between South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. While most of the region was controlled by the Dutch, East Timor became a Portuguese colony in the 16th century. Over time, the Dutch colony emerged as the independent Republic of Indonesia while East Timor remained under the control of the Portuguese. After the Portuguese withdrew in 1975, East Timor was annexed by Indonesia and thus began the struggle for independence. This struggle came in the form of famine, disease, and severe fighting as the Indonesian military forces refused to surrender their power.
Then in 1999, due to extreme international pressure, President Habbibie announced to hold a referendum on East Timor independence. The result of the referendum held on August 30 was clear, a majority vote of 78.5% were in favour of independence. Directly after the vote was finalized, Indonesian military became more aggressive than ever, campaigning for violence and extreme terrorism in retaliation. The outcome was devastating. Approximately 1 300 Timorese were killed, and 300 000 were forced into West Timor as refugees. The entire country suffered a violation of human rights. The majority of the country’s infrastructure, including homes, water supply systems, schools, and almost 100% of the country’s electrical grid were completely destroyed. Needless to further explain, the country was left in a state of disaster, desperately seeking external help.
The proximity of Australia (East Timor is 400 miles northwest of Australia), combined with Australia’s foreign policy (similar to Canada’s), made it the front runner to intervene and help the ongoing conflict. From 1999 to June 2009, Australia has provided over $820 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA). Although a generous contribution, Australia knew it would need external help in order to succeed.
Thus explaining how Canada came to be a part of the equation. It is clear that Canada’s involvement is the outcome of two notable reasons. For one, like mentioned above when Australia is directly committed to help East Timor, it is natural for it to call on its alliances around the world for help. Although Canada is located across the world, due to its similarities in government and lifestyle, it shares a political bond with Australia. Hence, when Australia called on Canada for action, Canada had to act in order to show commitment and keep tight political bonds. Secondly, due to its many reports on human rights abuse, this conflict became extremely publicized on the world stage. With the world watching, it was time for the country to take their words and liberal "beliefs" and put them into actions in order to maintain reputation.
In order to clearly assess the validity to Canada’s human security agenda in 1999, a clear assessment of Canada’s involvement must be analyzed. Canada did step up when the UN and Australian led INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) called for help. Yet, at what measures, and was it effective? The prime minister at the time, Chretien promised 600 troops from the Canadian forces[1]. This announcement was immediately attacked by critics who claimed that Canada did not have the ability to follow through with the promise. Yet, what Chretien did not detail was the breakdown of the 600 troops. People assumed the 600 troops were all infantry soldiers, yet this was not the case. The 600 included 250 naval personnel, 100 aircrew, 50 logistical and medical support, and finally only 200 infantry[2]. Australia had the highest contribution with about 5400 troops, and not even they could with stand against the extreme Indonesian forces. As nice of a gesture that 200 infantry soldiers may seem, does it translate as an effective means of helping the conflict in East Timor, or was it merely an effective way to keep national interest while maintaining Canada’s reputation?
An important area to explore is Canada’s involvement with Indonesia. In 1993, Canadian investments in Indonesia totaled approximately $3 billion[3]. By 1998, Canadian investments with Indonesia tripled to $9 billion[4]. Furthermore in 1999, Canada went ahead and exported a total of $21.8 million in substantial military exports, making Indonesia the fourth largest market for such exports that year[5]. The Canadian government could have demonstrated its commitment towards Indonesia by suspending its substantial military exports[6] in 1999. It is such activity which questions the validity of Canada’s true intentions. It is not a crime to put importance on national interest, yet the problem arises when one self categorizes itself as a true believer of human security over the well being of the state.
I am not attempting to put Canada down as a whole. In total there were only 22 countries in the world who contributed to INTERFET. I praise our country for its leadership and concern 
to promote human values around the world. Yet, I do believe the foreign policy needs a practical adjustment. With so many injustices in the world, it is not realistic to state that Canada will help every case where human rights are being violated with military means. Although in theory, Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister between 1996 and 2001, Lloyd Axworthy, foreign policy centered on preventing the abuse of human rights sounds ideal, it is not possible unless it is supported by a government who is truly committed to it. Let us not make promises we can not keep because even though it may appeal to the public in the short term, it is a set up for failure in the long term.
The conflict in East Timor pushed Canada to not only talk to the talk, but walk the walk. A task, they failed to accomplish. Perhaps the country’s policy was doomed to failure from the start, as its agenda is centered on ideals which naturally do not translate into action.
[1] T.S. Hataley & Kim Richard Nossal, “The Limits of the Human Security Agenda: The Case of Canada’s Response to the Timor Crisis,” Global Change, Peace & Security (Vol. 16, No.1. February 2004), pp 5-17.
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid
[4] Ibid
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
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